



Gerken, et al., v. Fair Political
Practices Commission, et al.
(State of California, Intervenor),
6 Cal. 4th 707, 93 D.A.R. 16121,
No. S025815 (Dec. 20, 1993).
Divided Court Declines to
Revive Proposition 68 After
Upholding Viability of Partially
In validated Proposition 73
Propositions 73 and 68, both designed
to implement campaign contribution re-
form, were each approved by the voters at
the June 1988 primary election; Proposi-
tion 73 garnered more affirmative votes
than did Proposition 68. Proposition 73
proposed to impose limits on campaign
contributions for all elective offices; pro-
hibit the use of public funds for campaign
expenditures; and prohibit elected offi-
cials from spending public funds on news-
letters and mass mailings. Proposition 68
proposed to impose contribution limita-
tions on state legislative candidates, and
further proposed to impose expenditure
limitations on qualified candidates who
elect to receive partially state-funded
matching funds. According to the court,
the two schemes were presented to the
voters as alternative, competing measures.
In Taxpayers to Limit Campaign
Spending v. Fair Political Practices Com-
mission, 51 Cal. 3d 744,274 Cal. Rptr. 787
(1990) (hereafter Taxpayers), the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that under the
California Constitution, when two or more
measures at the same election are compet-
ing initiatives and both pass, only the pro-
visions of the measure receiving the high-
est number of affirmative votes can be
enforced. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
declined to "merge" the two measures,
and instead held that Proposition 73 was
effective and that Proposition 68 was in-
operative. [11:1 CRLR 153-54] At the
conclusion of its Taxpayers opinion, the
court observed in a footnote that in Service
Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political
Practices Commission, 747 F. Supp. 580
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (Service Employees), the
U.S. District Court had recently invali-
dated as unconstitutional Proposition 73's
restrictions on campaign contributions
and transfers thereof [10:4 CRLR 189-
90]; however, the Supreme Court noted
that the district court's decision was not
final and did not invalidate the remainder
of Proposition 73. Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court did not decide in Taxpayers
whether an initiative measure that has no
effect at the time it is adopted because it is
superseded by another measure adopted
by a larger vote at the same election be-
comes effective if the latter is subse-
quently invalidated.
In this original mandamus proceeding,
petitioners raised the issue reserved in
Taxpayers; noting that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision in Service Employees
[12:2&3 CRLR 273-74], and that the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari review
of that judgment, petitioners asserted that
Proposition 73 had been invalidated and
Proposition 68 should be revived by oper-
ation of law. [12:4 CRLR 241] In a 4-3
decision, the Supreme Court disagreed,
thus leaving California bereft of contribu-
tion limitations for statewide and legisla-
tive campaigns despite the passage of two
initiatives indicating the electorate's in-
tent to impose them.
First, the majority noted that the Ser-
vice Employees plaintiffs primarily chal-
lenged Proposition 73's contribution lim-
itations, arguing that because they are
measured on a fiscal year instead of an
"election cycle" basis, they unconstitu-
tionally discriminate in favor of incum-
bents and their supporters and against
challengers and their supporters; plaintiffs
did not challenge the various other parts
of Proposition 73, which include rules re-
garding solicitation and use of funds, a
prohibition on the use of public funding
for campaigns, rules for special elections,
the regulation of honoraria, and a prohibi-
tion on publicly funded newsletters and
mass mailings. The district court found
that the fiscal year provisions of Proposi-
tion 73 are unconstitutional under the first
amendment; the district court then ad-
dressed the state law issue of whether
those provisions might be severed from
the contribution limitation provisions, and
concluded that the latter provisions could
not be saved. Accordingly, it struck the
contribution limitations and permanently
enjoined their enforcement.
In this proceeding, petitioners asserted
that because Proposition 73's contribution
limitations (insofar as they apply to pri-
mary and general elections) were invali-
dated and their enforcement enjoined, the
remaining parts of Proposition 73 (which
are not subject to the injunction) are like-
wise unenforceable because they are non-
severable from the invalidated portions of
the measure. In other words, petitioners
claimed that Proposition 73 was invali-
dated in its entirety as a result of the fed-
eral injunction.
In considering this argument, the ma-
jority noted that Proposition 73 contains a
severability clause which provides that
"[i]f any provision of this act, or the appli-
cation of any such provision to any person
or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the
remainder of this act to the extent it can be
given effect, or the application of those
provisions to persons or circumstances
other than those as to which it is held
invalid, shall not be affected thereby, and
to this end the provisions of this act are
severable." The court noted that, although
not conclusive, a severability clause nor-
mally calls for sustaining the valid part of
an enactment, especially when the invalid
part is mechanically severable. However,
the court held that the final determination
depends on whether the remaining portion
of the act is complete in itself and would
have been adopted by the legislative body
had it foreseen the partial invalidity of the
statute, or constitutes a completely opera-
tive expression of legislative intent and is
not so connected with the rest of the statute
as to be inseparable.
As a predicate to petitioners' claim that
all or part of Proposition 68 should be
revived, the majority held that they must
establish that Proposition 73 has been
completely invalidated, and that no "sub-
stantial part" of the measure remains ef-
fective; according to the majority, "[i]f
any substantial part of Proposition 73 re-
mains effective despite the federal injunc-
tion, petitioners' claim of revival of Prop-
osition 68, in whole or in part, must fail."
Therefore, the majority stated that it need
not decide the viability of each remaining
section of Proposition 73 in order to re-
solve petitioners' writ application, and de-
cided that "we can resolve this litigation
by finding that at least one substantial part
of Proposition 73 is severable and opera-
tive." According to the majority, "the sec-
tion that most clearly and easily meets this
requirement is section 89001, the ban on
publicly funded mass mailings."
Therefore, the majority considered
whether section 89001 is severable from
the invalidated provisions, noting that pe-
titioners had conceded that section
89001's ban on public funding of mass
mailings is grammatically and function-
ally separate from the contribution limits
enjoined by the federal courts; however,
"the question is whether the ban is also
volitionally separate from the enjoined
provisions." In concluding that it is, the
majority reviewed the official statements
made to the voters about Proposition 73 in
the ballot pamphlet, and found that the ban
on publicly funded mass mailings was
separately highlighted for the voters as
one of the goals that would be met by
passage of Proposition 73; the Legislative
Analyst specifically listed the ban on pub-
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licly funded mass mailings as one of the
three main goals of the initiative; the Leg-
islative Analyst emphasized the anticipated
savings that would result from the ban on
publicly funded mass mailings; and nothing
in the text of the measure suggested that the
ban on publicly funded mass mailings is
dependent on the existence of the enjoined
contribution limitations, or any other provi-
sion of the measure. The majority conceded
that the ballot arguments which followed the
text of the measure did not expressly address
the proposed public funding ban on mass
mailings. However, viewing the ballot ma-
terials as a whole, the majority concluded
that the ban on publicly funded mass mail-
ings was sufficiently highlighted to identify
it as worthy of independent consideration.
Further, the majority held that the
electorate's attention was sufficiently fo-
cused upon the ban on public funding of
mass mailings so that it would have sepa-
rately considered and adopted that ban in the
absence of the enjoined portions. The major-
ity thus concluded that "section 89001 re-
mains effective despite (and regardless of)
the federal injunction against enforcement
of Proposition 73's campaign contribution
provisions" and that, "although the ban on
public funding of mass mailings was not the
'heart' or 'dominant purpose' of the mea-
sure, it was a substantial feature of the initia-
tive." Accordingly, the majority held that
petitioners cannot show that, by reason of
the federal injunction, Proposition 73 has
been invalidated.
Petitioners also argued that the factual
premise underlying the Taxpayers deci-
sion-namely, that Propositions 73 and 68
were competing, alternative statutory
schemes-was undermined by the federal
injunction; petitioners contended that even
if Proposition 73's remaining provisions are
all severable, the measure has been so di-
luted that it would no longer constitute a
competing, alternative statutory scheme, as
compared with Proposition 68, and hence
the state Constitution should be read to re-
quire the courts to merge the nonconflicting
parts of the two measures. The majority
rejected petitioners' assertion that the factual
premise of Taxpayers has been undermined
by events occurring after the June 1988 elec-
tion, stating that the rule articulated in Tax-
payers looks to the nature of the measures as
they were presented to the voters. Accord-
ingly, the majority rejected the suggestion
that the federal injunction has transformed
Propositions 73 and 68 from alternative,
competing measures that cannot be merged,
into complementary, supplementary mea-
sures that must be merged.
Justice Arabian was joined by Justices
Mosk and Kennard in a stinging dissent.
The dissent noted that "[a]n attachment to
the principle of popular sovereignty" has
characterized a long line of California Su-
preme Court decisions. "Yet it is that very
principle that the majority breach in de-
claring that the clear desire of the voters
to impose real controls on the stream of
money corroding our political life-a de-
sire expressed not once, but twice in the
same election-has produced what? Little
more than a ban on officeholders' use of
their mailing privileges" (emphasis origi-
nal). Quoting from the court's own opin-
ion in Taxpayers, the dissent argued that
"the dominant, indeed, the inducing pur-
pose of Proposition 73, was to enact a
'comprehensive regulatory scheme' that
would limit political contributions to can-
didates for public office," and contended
that the federal courts' invalidation of
Proposition 73's campaign contribution
limits "completely thwarts its overriding
purpose." Thus, the dissent concluded that
no provision of Proposition 73 is sever-
able from the contribution limitation pro-
visions invalidated by the federal courts;
Proposition 73 is completely nullified;
and Proposition 68, "the rival campaign
finance reform measure approved by the
voters at the June 1988 election," prevails.




6 Cal. 4th 821, 93 D.A.R. 16426,
No. S029178 (Dec. 23, 1993).
Operations Committee of Retire-
ment Board Is Not 'Legislative
Body' Subject to Statutory Open
Meeting Requirements
In this proceeding, the California Su-
preme Court interpreted the Ralph M.
Brown Act, Government Code section
54950 et seq., which provides that all meet-
ings of the "legislative body" of a local
agency shall be open and public, except as
otherwise provided in the Act. [12:4 CRLR
242] Government Code section 54952.3
specifically addresses advisory bodies of
local agencies, and provides that the term
"legislative body" includes "any advisory
commission, advisory committee or advi-
sory body of a local agency, created by
charter, ordinance, resolution, orby any sim-
ilar formal action of a legislative body or
member of a legislative body of a local
agency." However, section 54952.3 also
provides that the term "legislative body," as
it is used in that section, does not include "a
committee composed solely of members of
the governing body of a local agency which
are less than a quorum of such governing
body."
The parties to this proceeding-the nine-
member board governing the Orange
County Employees Retirement System and
Freedom Newspapers, which sought access
to meetings of the four-member advisory
Operations Committee of the Board-dis-
agreed over the meaning of the less-than-a-
quorum exception contained in section
54952.3. The Board and its amici curiae,
including the Attorney General, argued that
an advisory committee that is excluded from
the definition of "legislative body" under
section 54952.3 is completely exempt from
the open meeting requirements of the Act;
Freedom Newspapers and its amici curiae
contended that the less-than-a-quorum ex-
ception in section 54952.3 merely exempts
less-than-a-quorum committees from the
special, relaxed procedural requirements
also contained section 54952.3, butthat such
committee remain subject to the stricteropen
meeting requirements that are generally ap-
plicable to "legislative bodies" under Gov-
ernment Code section 54952. The Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that even the
Board's four-member advisory committee is
subject to the Brown Act, because it meets
the definition of "legislative body" in section
54952 ("any board, commission, commit-
tee, or other body on which officers of a local
agency serve in their official capacity as
members and which is supported in whole
or in part by funds provided by such agency,
whether such board, commission, commit-
tee or other body is organized and operated
by such local agency or by a private corpo-
ration"). [12:4 CRLR 242]
The Supreme Court reversed. Accord-
ing to the majority, "the legislature's ac-
tion in two respects since the 1968 enact-
ment of section 54952.3 indicate [sic] its
continuing understanding that advisory
committees comprised solely of less than
a quorum of the governing body are ex-
empt from the opening meeting require-
ments of the [Brown] Act." Although ac-
knowledging that legislative acquies-
cence is a weak indication of legislative
intent, the court noted that the legislature
has not attempted to legislatively super-
sede the appellate court decision in Hen-
derson v. Board of Education, 78 Cal.
App. 3d 875 (1978); in Henderson, the
court held that ad hoc advisory commit-
tees created for the purpose of advising the
Board of Education, and which were com-
posed solely of members of the governing
body of each school district numbering
less than a quorum of the governing body,
were not subject to the Brown Act.
Second, the court noted that in 1992 the
legislature attempted to extend the coverage
of the Brown Act by limiting the coverage
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of the express less-than-a-quorum excep-
tion in section 54952.3 to "ad hoc" advi-
sory committees (thus subjecting "stand-
ing" committees-regardless of their
membership-to the Act). According to
the court, "[t]his legislation is the strong-
est indication that the current version of
section 54952.3 excludes less-than-a-quo-
rum advisory committees from the Act's
open meeting requirements, rather than
merely from the less-stringent procedural
requirements in section 54952.3." Al-
though Governor Wilson vetoed the legisla-
tion, the court held that the legislature's
adoption of subsequent, amending legisla-
tion that is ultimately vetoed may be consid-
ered as evidence of the legislature's under-
standing of the unamended, existing statute.
The court concluded that it is more
consistent with legislative intent to con-
strue the less-than-a-quorum exception
contained in section 54952.3 as an excep-
tion to the definition of "legislative body,"
and thus one of several exceptions tothe
Brown Act's opening meeting require-
ments, rather than merely as an exception
to the special procedural requirements of
section 54952.3.
Justice Kennard dissented from the ma-
jority opinion, arguing that it conflicts with
legislative intent as clearly revealed in the
preamble to the Brown Act, Government
Code section 54950. Justice Mosk con-
curred and dissented, observing that SB
1140 (Calderon) (Chapter 1138, Statutes of
1993) becomes effective on April 1, 1994,
and substantially amends section 54952.3 to
distinguish between "ad hoc" and "stand-
ing" advisory committees, subjecting the
latter-to the extent they "have a continuing
subject matter jurisdiction"-to the Brown
Act's open meeting requirements. 113:4
CRLR 232] Justice Mosk found the matter
to have been mooted by the enactment of SB
1140, and would have dismissed the Court's
review as "improvidently granted."
CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Tirapelle v. Davis (California
State Employees Association, et.
al., Intervenors and Appellants),
20 Cal. App. 4th 1317, 93 D.A.R.
15535, No. C012772 (Dec. 8, 1993).
State Controller May Not Refuse to
Implement Salary Reductions for
Exempt Civil Service Employees
In this appeal, the Third District Court
of Appeal considered the authority of the
State Controller to refuse to implement
salary reductions established in 1991 by
the Department of Personnel Administra-
tion (DPA) for certain administrative and
supervisorial employees of the state who
are not entitled to engage in collective
bargaining under the Ralph C. Dills Act.
By way of background information,
the court noted that at the outset of its
1991-92 fiscal year, the state of California
faced an unprecedented budgetary crisis;
the crisis was precipitated by a significant
projected revenue-to-expenditure short-
fall. In the Budget Act of 1991, the legisla-
ture and the Governor attempted to deal
with the shortfall in a number of ways; one
of those ways is found in section 3.90 of
the Act, which instructed the Director of
Finance to allocate reductions to general
fund employee compensation line items
by $351 million. [11:4 CRLR 51-52, 54]
The court explained the roles of the
various "players" in this matter. Although
the Department of Finance (DOF) has
general powers of supervision over all
matters concerning the financial and busi-
ness policies of the state, the power of
appropriation resides exclusively in the
legislature. Under the Budget Act of 199 1,
the legislature required the Director of
Finance to allocate reductions in the ap-
propriations for employee compensation
in each item of the budget in order to
provide for an overall reduction in em-
ployee compensation in the amount of
$351 million; DOF was not delegated the
responsibility for achieving the reduced
spending necessitated by the budget re-
ductions. The task of determining how to
achieve budget reductions in employee
compensation items fell largely to DPA,
which manages the nonmerit aspects of
the state's personnel system; in general,
DPA has jurisdiction over the state's finan-
cial relationship with its employees, in-
cluding matters of salary, layoffs and non-
disciplinary demotions. The Controller is
a state constitutional officer who is elected
at the same time and for the same term as
the Governor. The state Constitution pro-
vides that money may be drawn from the
state treasury only through an appropria-
tion made by law and upon a Controller's
duly drawn warrant.
The court also noted that there are lim-
ited means by which employee compensa-
tion can be reduced so as to stay within
employee compensation budget allot-
ments; the available means fall into the
broad categories of reducing the size of the
workforce, reducing the compensation
payable on a per employee basis, or some
combination thereof. DPA asserted that
the employee compensation allotment re-
ductions of the Budget Act of 1991 raised
the specter of significant employee lay-
offs; it therefore determined to attempt to
reduce salaries in order to minimize the
need for layoffs. The salary reduction tar-
get chosen by the DPA was 5% per em-
ployee.
The Third District has already consid-
ered-and rejected-one aspect of DPA's
effort to reduce employee compensation
items during the 1991-92 fiscal year. De-
partment of Personnel Administration v.
Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 4th 155
(1992), involved rank and file employees
who were represented for purposes of col-
lective bargaining under the Dills Act.
DPA, as the Governor's designated repre-
sentative, and various employee unions
had negotiated and participated in media-
tion but had reached an impasse; DPA then
purported to impose its "last, best offer"
upon the employees, which included 5%
salary reductions. The employee unions
successfully petitioned the superior court
for extraordinary relief precluding im-
plementation of the DPA directive. DPA
then petitioned the Third District for a writ
of mandate compel ling the superior court
to set aside its judgment. In considering
the issues presented in that proceeding, the
Third District noted that the Dills Act is a
"suppression statute"; that is, the parties
are permitted to override otherwise appli-
cable statutory provisions in a memoran-
dum of understanding (MOU), but in the
absence of an existing MOU, those statu-
tory provisions apply. DPA's salary setting
function, set forth in Government Code
section 19826, is one of the statutory pro-
visions which may be overridden in a
MOU. However, with respect to repre-
sented employees under the Dills Act, sec-
tion 19826(b) specifically provides that
the DPA "shall not establish, adjust, or
recommend a salary range." Since the
parties' MOU had expired and they were
at an impasse, section 19826 was applica-
ble, but that section prohibited the DPA
from imposing salary reductions. Accord-
ingly, the court found that DPA had no
authority to impose salary reductions
upon represented employees at impasse
during collective bargaining. [12:2&3
CRLR 55]
The current proceeding involves a dif-
ferent aspect of DPA's efforts to reduce
employee compensation, as it is con-
cerned with managerial and supervisory
employees in civil service and certain ex-
empt employees; managerial and supervi-
sory employees and civil service exempt
positions are excluded from the provisions
of the Dills Act. On July 1, 1991, DPA
announced an immediate general salary
decrease for classes designated manage-
rial and "E99." With a few exceptions to
which lesser decreases applied, salaries
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were reduced by 5%. In August 1991, DPA
announced 5% salary decreases for supervi-
sorial employees effective with the Septem-
ber 1991 paychecks. The Controller initially
implemented the managerial employee
compensation reductions. However, in Sep-
tember 1991, he announced that he would
not implement the supervisory employee
compensation reductions, would cease im-
plementing the managerial compensation
reductions, and would repay managerial em-
ployees for sums which had previously been
withheld. DPA petitioned for a writ of man-
date compelling the Controller to implement
its salary reduction decisions. A number of
employee organizations intervened; the trial
court granted the relief sought by the DPA.
t12:1 CRLR 37]
The Third District found that, with re-
spect to the Controller's duties and authority,
the Constitution follows a "minimalist ap-
proach." That is, it provides for the office but
primarily leaves it to the legislature to define
the duties and functions of the Controller,
the legislature has wide discretion in defin-
ing the duties and functions of the office.
After reviewing many of the Controller's
duties, the court found that although in some
circumstances the Controller may have dis-
cretionary duties, the greater part of the du-
ties devolved upon him by the law are of a
ministerial character, and concluded that he
has no discretion as to the issuance of war-
rants for appropriations for the public ser-
vice. While the Controller disagreed with
DPA's decision to reduce salary levels, he
did not point to any provision of law which
would authorize payment of salaries at the
prior higher levels pending resolution of
disputes over the reductions. The court
stated that the Controller "may not draw a
warrant upon the Treasury except as directed
by law. With respect to the compensation of
state employees the legislature has not seen
fit to delegate to the Controller any supervi-
sory or review powers over the decisions of
the DPA. The Controller has the power to
audit salary claims, but this is far from being
authorized to fix compensation. Although
disputes over salary levels inevitably arise
the legislature has not provided that the de-
cisions of the DPA should be held in abey-
ance nor has it authorized the Controller to
fix salary levels pending resolution of such
disputes."
The Controller and the intervenors
also argued that DPA failed to give appro-
priate consideration to prevailing pay
rates, as it is required by law to do when
it is establishing or changing salary
ranges. Although DPA submitted declara-
tions asserting that consideration had
been given to prevailing rates, the Con-
troller and intervenors responded that
DPA failed to satisfy its burden of show-
ing that it gave appropriate consideration
to prevailing rates because it relied upon
data that were considered in connection
with January 1, 1991, salary increases and
which were thus stale; the data concerned
rank and file pay rates rather than supervi-
sor and manager salaries; the data were in
raw form without statistical analysis; and
the consideration given to the data was
perfunctory. In response, the court reiter-
ated that the Controller had no authority
to call DPA before him to justify its exer-
cise of the authority delegated to it by the
legislature, and that, accordingly, DPA
had no burden to carry.
The Controller further asserted that even
if DPA had authority over civil service em-
ployees, it had no authority to reduce the
salaries of exempt employees. The court
noted that although exempt positions are not
subject to civil service laws, they are never-
theless governed by laws otherwise applica-
ble to state employment. DPA's approval
authority over the salaries of civil service
exempt employees is set forth in Govern-
ment Code section 19825(a), which pro-
vides that such salaries are subject only to
the approval of DPA before they become
effective and payable. Although noting that
the power of approval over expenditures
generally implies an exercise of some degree
of discretion and thus confers greater author-
ity than the ministerial power of audit, the
court agreed that the mere power of approval
over compensation, standing alone, is not
itself sufficient authorization to reduce sala-
ries when the power to fix those salaries is
exclusively conferred upon a different
agency. According to the court, the power of
approval must be coupled with some other
supervisory control over the salaries or em-
ployees in question in order to authorize a
reduction or change in salary by the approv-
ing agency. In this case, the court found that
because both the power of approval and the
authority over the administration of salaries
of exempt employees resides in DPA, DPA
is vested with discretion over the salaries of
civil service exempt employees which the
Controller is not free to disregard.
Elizabeth D. v. Director of Motor
Vehicles, Department of Motor
Vehicles,
21 Cal. App. 4th 347,93 D.A.R.
16408, No. B064904 (Dec. 23, 1993).




In May 1991, appellant Elizabeth D.
suffered a seizure while at work, lost con-
sciousness, and was taken to the hospital;
in July 1991, based on information re-
ceived from her physician, the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles (DMV) notified
appellant that her driver's license was sus-
pended. Following an administrative
hearing conducted at the request of appel-
lant, the DMV subsequently sustained the
suspension. In October 1991, appellant
filed a petition for writ of mandate under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5,
seeking to compel the DMV to restore her
driver's license; she contended that DMV
abused its discretion because the evidence
at the administrative hearing did not sup-
port DMV's findings that she suffered
from a condition characterized by lapses
of consciousness or control which pre-
cluded her safe operation of a motor vehi-
cle. However, appellant did not provide a
transcript of the administrative hearing,
instead submitting various documents,
some of which were not introduced during
the course of the administrative review. In
its opposition, DMV cited in part to the
administrative hearing transcript, but did
not attach it or any of the exhibits to its
papers. The trial court, after noting that it
did not have a copy of the administrative
hearing transcript and must look at the
entire evidentiary record de novo, in-
formed DMV's counsel that it was his
responsibility to bring the administrative
record before the court, and granted
appellant's petition after an independent
evaluation of the evidence presented to it.
DMV appealed, contending that the trial
court abused its discretion in rendering a
decision without reviewing the entire ad-
ministrative record.
On appeal, the Second District Court
of Appeal noted that section 1094.5 pro-
vides that "[a]ll or part of the record of the
proceedings before the inferior tribunal,
corporation, board, or officer may be filed
with the petition, may be filed with
respondent's points and authorities, or
may be ordered to be filed by the court."
The court noted that although section
1094.5 allows both parties in a mandamus
proceeding to file either "all or part" of the
record of the administrative proceeding
for review by the court, "this does not
mean respondent is required to file the
administrative record or that petition is
relieved from the burden of providing a
sufficient enough record to establish
error" (emphasis original). The court held
that in a section 1094.5 proceeding, it is
the responsibility of the petitioner to pro-
duce a sufficient record of the administra-
tive proceedings, noting that the "DMV is
not required to show it was right. It was up
to Elizabeth D. to supply a sufficient re-
cord to show the DMV was wrong."
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Further, the court held that section
1094.5 imposes limitations on the trial
court's authority to admit and consider
new evidence; specifically, the section
provides that where the court finds that
there is relevant evidence which, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, could not
have been produced or which was im-
properly excluded at the administrative
hearing, it may either remand the case to
be reconsidered in light of the new evi-
dence or, in cases in which the court is
authorized by law to exercise its indepen-
dent judgment on the evidence, admit the
evidence at the hearing on the writ without
remanding the case. The court found that
certain evidence submitted by appellant to
the trial court did not constitute new evi-
dence for purposes of section 1094.5; be-
cause that evidence could have been pro-
duced at the administrative hearing but
was not, the court found that for purposes
of the petition it is inadmissible. The Sec-
ond District then reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the matter to DMV
with instructions to conduct a supple-
mented hearing on the new evidence re-
garding petitioner's present medical con-
dition.
Mogilefsky v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles (Silver Pictures, et
al., Real Parties in Interest),
20 Cal. App. 4th 1409,93 D.A.R.
15679, No. B072438 (Dec. 10, 1993).
Same-Gender Sexual Harassment
Can Be Basis for Cause of Action
Under Fair Employment Act
In this writ proceeding, the Second
District Court of Appeal considered whether
same-gender sexual harassment may be
the basis of a cause of action for sexual
harassment in violation of the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (FEHA), spe-
cifically Government Code section
12940(h).
Petitioner Wayne Mogilefsky alleged
that he was subjected to sexual harassment
and sexual discrimination by his supervi-
sor, Michael Levy, during the course of his
employment as creative editor for real par-
ties in interest Silver Pictures, Warner
Brothers, and Joel Silver. Specifically, pe-
titioner alleged that, on two occasions,
Levy-the president of Silver Pictures-
demanded that petitioner stay overnight in
Levy's hotel suite. On the first occasion,
Levy allegedly informed petitioner that he
would receive more money if he cooper-
ated, ordered petitioner to play a porno-
graphic film on the VCR, made lewd and
lascivious comments about the film, and
asked petitioner how much he would
charge to perform acts similar to those
depicted in the film. The next morning,
Levy allegedly falsely implied to others
that petitioner engaged in sex with him.
On the second occasion, Levy allegedly
referred to petitioner in a profane and de-
grading manner and inquired repeatedly
into petitioner's private life, including
questions regarding his prior relation-
ships. Very early the next morning, Levy
called petitioner, told him he wanted to
sleep next to him, and instructed him to
come to his hotel suite. Petitioner alleged
that he went to Levy's suite the second
time only after being informed by others
that he had no choice in the matter, that
attendance at the suite was mandatory, that
another male employee had been fired for
not going to Levy's suite when ordered to
do so, and that petitioner should consider
the consequences before refusing. Peti-
tioner alleged that these acts were viola-
tions of the duties imposed upon real par-
ties in interest by Government Code sec-
tion 12940, including its prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of gen-
der, asking for sexual favors in return for
favorable treatment in the workplace, and
making sexual requests with an explicit or
implicit quid pro quo consequence in the
workplace.
Real parties in interest Silver Pictures,
Warner Brothers, and Joel Silver generally
demurred to the first cause of action, con-
tending that sexually suggestive remarks
by one male to another with no physical
touching did not constitute an unfair em-
ployment practice under Government
Code section 12940. Real party in interest
Michael Levy filed a separate demurrer to
the first cause of action in which he as-
serted facts contradictory to those alleged
in petitioner's complaint and argued that
"[elven assuming the truth of plaintiff's
allegations, plaintiff only alleges incidents
of 'sexually explicit jokes, comments and
innuendoes [sic],' and the use of 'profane
and sexually explicit language."' These al-
legations, Levy argued, could not state a
cause of action for sexual harassment as a
matter of law. The trial court sustained the
demurrers without leave to amend.
On appeal, the Second District ex-
plained that Government Code section
12940 defines eleven unlawful employ-
ment practices prohibited by FEHA, in-
cluding sexual discrimination and sexual
harassment; the court noted that there is
some overlapping of prohibited practices
in these two sections, as recognized by
cases holding that sexual harassment is a
form of discrimination. The court ex-
plained that the primary distinction be-
tween the two is that an employee alleging
discrimination must allege facts demon-
strating that he/she was discriminated
against "in compensation or in terms, con-
ditions or privileges of employment,"
whereas an employee alleging sexual ha-
rassment need not allege loss of tangible
job benefits.
Petitioner's cause of action was for
sexual harassment; California caselaw
recognizes two theories upon which sex-
ual harassment may be alleged. The first
is quid pro quo harassment, where a term
of employment is conditioned upon sub-
mission to unwelcome sexual advances;
the second is hostile work environment,
where the harassment is sufficiently per-
vasive so as to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive work
environment. Petitioner's first amended
complaint invoked both theories by alleg-
ing that Levy and one of Levy's employ-
ees informed petitioner that he would "re-
ceive more money on his writing deal if he
came to the hotel suite" (quid pro quo),
and by alleging that a hostile, sexually
harassing environment existed which dis-
rupted petitioner's "emotional tranquility
in the workplace and otherwise interfered
with and undermined his personal sense of
well being" (hostile environment).
A cause of action for quid pro quo
harassment involves the behavior most
commonly regarded as sexual harassment,
including sexual propositions, unwar-
ranted graphic discussion of sexual acts,
and commentary on the employee's body
and the sexual uses to which it could be
put. To state a cause of action on this
theory, is it sufficient to allege that a term
of employment was expressly or im-
pliedly conditioned upon acceptance of a
supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances.
By contrast, a cause of action for sexual
harassment on a hostile environment the-
ory need not allege any sexual advances
whatsoever. A cause of action on this the-
ory is stated where it is alleged that an
employer created a hostile environment
for an employee because of that employee's
gender. The court noted that, as might be
expected, cases sometimes involve a hy-
brid of these two theories; for example, a
hostile work environment may result from
inappropriate sexual conduct in the work-
place. Under such circumstances, the
plaintiff may allege that the unwelcome
sexual advances were sufficiently perva-
sive so as to also alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive work
environment.
According to the court, there is "no
basis of support in the statutory language
for the contention that the legislature in-
tended to limit protection from sexual ha-
rassment to male-female harassment. Al-
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though the statute does not specify
whether it prohibits 'same gender' harass-
ment or 'other gender' harassment, no am-
biguity is created by this omission. Com-
mon usage indicates that in the absence of
a modifying adjective, the legislature in-
tended to prohibit sexual harassment in all
cases."
In an effort to avoid the conclusion that
the statute applies in this case, real parties
in interest urged that the legislature did not
intend to "protect members of the empow-
ered majority [men] from one another." In
rejecting this contention, the court held
that a person subjected to such behavior in
California is entitled to the protection pro-
vided by Government Code section 12940
regardless of whether he/she is otherwise
"empowered." The court was similarly
unpersuaded by the policy arguments ad-
vanced by real parties in interest. Real
parties' expressed fear that freeing "every-
one from sexual remarks and conduct"
would "put the First Amendment right of
free speech on the endangered species
list"; according to the court, this argument
reveals real parties' superficial under-
standing of the First Amendment's protec-
tions. Nor did the court share real parties'
concern that allowing a cause of action for
same-gender sexual harassment will
"make an inquiry into the sexual orienta-
tion of the male supervisor an absolute
necessity." The focus of a cause of action
brought pursuant to Government Code
section 12940 is whether the victim has
been subjected to sexual harassment, not
what motivated the harasser.
The court therefore concluded that a
cause of action for sexual harassment in
violation of Government Code section
12940(h) may be stated by a member of
the same sex as the harasser, whether
based on the quid pro quo theory, the




Opinion No. 93-212 (Dec. 30,1993).
City May Not Make It a
Misdemeanor to Disclose
Substance of Discussion In
Closed City Council Meeting
Senator Robert Presley requested the
California Attorney General to issue an
opinion on whether a city may adopt an
ordinance making it a misdemeanor for
any person present during a duly con-
ducted closed session of a city council
meeting to publicly disclose the substance
of any discussion properly held during the
session unless so authorized by the coun-
cil. Initially, the Attorney General noted
that the Brown Act, Government Code
section 54950 et seq., requires the legisla-
tive bodies of local agencies to hold their
meetings in public unless expressly ex-
cepted by the Act or impliedly excepted
by another provision of law pertaining to
confidential communications. The Act
contains numerous provisions authorizing
the holding of closed sessions; according
to the Attorney General, "[t]he public pol-
icy reasons for authorizing closed sessions
for public body deliberations appear al-
most as numerous as the individual ex-
emptions contained in the Act itself."
The Attorney General noted that its
office routinely observes that it would be
"improper" for information received dur-
ing a closed session to be publicly dis-
closed without authorization of the gov-
erning body as a whole; however, the issue
in question pertains solely to the authority
of a city to make a crime of disclosing
information under such circumstances. In
considering this question, the Attorney
General noted that a city possesses and
may exercise only such powers as are
granted it by the Constitution or by stat-
utes, together with those powers that arise
by necessary implication from those ex-
pressly granted; if an ordinance of a gen-
eral law city conflicts with state law, it is
void under the limited grant of constitu-
tional authority. Under California caselaw, a
conflict exists if the ordinance duplicates,
contradicts, or enters an area fully occu-
pied by general law, either expressly or by
legislative implication. Further, when the
state has occupied a particular field, not
even complementary or supplementary
local legislation is permitted.
The Attorney General noted that the
Brown Act already contains specific and
general criminal sanctions for certain ac-
tivities, and concluded that "a local mis-
demeanor ordinance to further enforce the
Act's provisions would be in conflict with
state legislation either by duplicating it or
being supplemental thereto in an area fully
occupied by the legislature." Therefore,
the Attorney General concluded that a city
may not adopt an ordinance making it a
misdemeanor for any person present dur-
ing a duly conducted closed session of a
city council meeting to publicly disclose
the substance of any discussion properly
held during the session unless so author-
ized by the council.
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